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ABSTRACT

The U.S. Congress and executive have battled since the
presidency of George Washington over which branch of
government should initiate military actions. While Congress

is granted.the pow?er to declare war, the executive is
vested with powers that are not as exhaustively listed as
those of the legisilative and the judiciary. This has
allowed the execut;ive to assume presidential prerogatives

that appear to some to be unlimited, causing Congress to
react with legislation designed to counter presidential
power.

The conflicts between Congress and the executive are

the result of an ambiguity in executive power that the
framers of the Constitution

found impossible to resolve,

Without presuming to draw definitive conclusions on the
issue, this thesis will examine the conflicting notions of

executive power anil how they apply to various "presidential
wars" that were conducted without prior congressional
approval.
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Chapter 1:
Thesis Overview

A definitive theory of executive power on which both

Congress and the executive concur has proven elusive. While
the Constitutioh attempts to delineate the separation of

powers between the legislative, judicial and executive
branches of goverhment, debates over original intent (i.e.,
what the framers of the Constitution intended) and

presidential prerogative (i.e., presidential power beyorid
that which is clearly granted by the Constitution) began
before the Cohstitution was ratified and continues to this

Many scholars have noted the ambiguity of executive

power and the problems that have developed from it. This
ambiguity has resulted ip incessant conflicts between
Congress and the executive, especially on issues related to

war powers. Congress professes to promote a strict
adherence to the Constitution because it grants it the

power to declare war — though Congress has often used the
ambiguity of executive power to shield itself from
criticism. Presidents focus on the notion of prerogative.

which they can use to assume powers beyond those strictly
granted to the executive by the Constitution.
To complicate matters, there are other reasons why

political battles have waged since the presidency of George
Washington between Congress and the executive over the
scope of their respective war powers. Though the
Constitution clearly states that Congress has the power to

declare war, and the executive the charge to make (i.e.,

"conduct") war, ^

there are scholars who cite problems of

diction and consider the wording of the Constitution too

equivocal. However, James Madison (the chief drafter of the
Constitution) did not seem to intend any such ambiguity
when he stated that "Those who conduct war cannot in the

nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war

ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded."
In the context of delineating Constitutional war

powers, we will discuss how the issues of executive power,
diction, necessity and pragmatism have affected how the

principles embodied in the Constitution are applied, and
how the application of the principles can change over time
and be influenced by specific time periods.

In addition to focussing on war powers, we will
discuss the related issue of congressional influence on

foreign affairs, and what sortie scholars consider an

increasing imbalance of power in favor of the executive
that has diminished significantly the ability of Congress
to guide foreign policy.

As we evaluate actions of Congress and the executive,

we will employ approaches intended to be objective, yet
critical. Original intent of the Constitution must be
considered, as well as the many and complex views of

executive power. However, what we may find most
illuminating in judging presidential actions related to war

powers is circumstance. This should not be surprising if
one considers the work of Thucydides, the Greek considered

the father of political realism. His histories of the

Pelopponesian Wars demonstrate how wars both require
different — and often drastic — measures from leaders,

while bringing to the fore man's natural instinct to eschew

justice in times of necessity. ^ This will be discussed
later in relation to the actions - which some scholars

consider unconstitutional — of President Abraham Lincoln

during the Civil War.

Though this thesis ultimately promotes the belief that

presidents too often have abused the concept of prerogative
to conduct military actions that were not sanctioned by

Congress, it does not attempt to draw firm conclusions
regarding a fixed concept of the nature of executive power
or to delineate definitively the appropriate circumstances
in which only Congress can sanction the use of U.S. troops.

Due to the complexities of the issues involved, we may find
our discussion more illuminating if we evaluate

presidential actions by asking the following questions:
• What are the constitutional guidelines?: While we

should be prepared to entertain a flexible
interpretation of the Constitution in some
instances, we should also be aware of its set

principles before evaluating presidential
actions.

• What actions were taken?; There is an obvious

difference between a president sending troops

abroad for peace-keeping missions — even into

areas that may have active military action — than
a president using troops to attack another

country without provocation or congressional
approval.

• What were the overall and partiGular circumstances
in which the actions were taken?; We will discuss

latei: in great detail the importance of

"situation" in the evaluation of presidential
actions and understahd how measures taken by

Lincoln during an insurrection were different
from Folk's actions in the Mexican War or Lyndon
Johnson's during the Vietnam War.
• What were the outcomes?: This is a question based on

both the currently popular notion of "equality of

result" ^ — and on Machiavelli's well-known "ends
justifying the means." Should we judge presidents
whose actions were less successful more harshly
than those who triumphed? Do we allow more
ektreme action for those that succeed than for

those that fail, even under the same conditions?
• How might the actions be interpreted by the Supreme

Court?; History shows that the Suprenie Court has

never upheld a presidential claim of war power
against that of Congress and that only one lower

court ever decided against Congress ^

The Court

often considers original intent — which seems to

favor a strict interpretation of the Constitution
and limited executive war power — and has used
The Federalist Papers in its adjudications.

What is the character of the president in question?:
Is there consensus that the president truly acted

in the interests of the common good, or is he

abusing executive prerogative for individual,
selfish motives? The former might be best

exemplified by Jefferson taking actions beyond
powers vested in the executive to complete the

Louisiana Purchase, ^ and the latter
exemplified by Nixon's actions during the

Watergate investigations. ^
What are the prevailing concepts of executive power

in relation to the limits of the president?: This
is a highly theoretical question that seems

rarely voiced in congressional debate, yet it
lies at the crux of the matter. Congress

favors a strict, literal interpretation of the
Constitution, so its arguments for reasserting

its power to declare war and to be involved more

in foreign affairs can seem superficial. Congress
does not sufficiently argue its points by

discussing the notions of executive power,
original intent, how perceptions of it change
over the years — or in different situations — nor

why many constitutional scholars confidently make
the case for presidential prerogative.
How did the Cold War affect the need for
presidential prerogative and how does the post-

Cold War era necessitate the need for a different
approach to foreign affairs?

Using the aboye measures, this thesis will begin by

reviewing the mandates of the Constitution and what is
considered "Original intent." Next, we will review key
theories of executive power before examining several cases

of extraordinary — and sometimes clearly unconstitutional 

presidential military actions. This will lead us to a
description of the 1973 War Powers Act, an attempt by

Congress to reassert its own constitutional prerogatives

and wield more power in foreign affairs, especially when
U.S. troops are deployed abroad.

Though this thesis promises no definitive answers on
how to resolve contested use of presidential prerogative,

it will provide an overview of the issues that should be
considered before evaluating presidential actions, and

conclude with a discussion on the limits of presidential

Chapter IZ:

Perspectives on the Constitution and Original Intent

IVe can see that more is at stake even than the constitutional

principle of the separation of powers. At stake is the age-long effort
of men to fix effective limits on government; at stake is the
reconciliation of the claims of freedom and of security; at stake the

fateful issue of peace or war, and issue fateful not for the American

people alone, not alone for the stricken peoples of Southeast Asia, but
for the whole of mankind.
8

Henry Steel Coinmager

One cannot discuss the appropriate assignment of war

powers in the United States without first studying the
Constitution and considering the original intent of its
framers. Article I, Section eight of the Constitution

clearly places the power to declare war in Congress (see
Appendix A). Nowhere is that power granted to the
executive. Article II, Section two provides three major

areas of presidential power: administration, legislation,
and foreign affairs. It designates the executive as the
Commander-in-Chief and grants that branch of government the

power — "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate"
— to make treaties (Appendix B).

On a superficial basis, the intent of the Founding
Fathers seems indisputable. They had followed the advice of
the French writer and jurist Montesquieu, who held that

governmental powers should be separated and balanced to

guarantee individual rights and freedom. Madison believed
that constitutional liberties could be preserved only by

reserving the power of war to Congress. In The Federalist
47, he stated that "The accumulations of all powers,

legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands
... may justly be pronounced the very definition of

In addition to Montesquieu, the Founding Fathers drew

from the writings of Polybius, a Greek historian who had
lived in Rome. He had studied that empire's system of

government and wrote a forty-volume Universal History to
show how and why all the civilized countries of the world
had fallen under the dominion of Rome. He — like Aristotle

before him and Montesquieu much later — concluded that the
most successful form of government was one that provided
for a separation of powers.
Thomas Jefferson was also a defender of a government

that granted Congress the power to declare war. While
Secretary of State, he made the following statement:
Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to
decide between war, tribute, and ransom, as the

means of re-establishing our Mediterranean
commerce. If war, they will consider how far our

10

resources shall be called forth, and how far they
will enable the Executive to engage, in the forms
of the constitution, the cooperation of other
powers.

Even Alexander Hamilton - known for his support of a

strong executive branch to achieve "executive energy" and
avoid "legislative usurption" of presidential prerogative —
differentiated between the power of a president and that of
a monarch. In The Federalist 69, Hamilton stated that

"There is no comparison between the intended power of the

President and the actual power of the British sovereign.""
Agreeing with Hamilton, in 1999 Texas Congressman Ron

Paul expressed his concern about the increase of

"presidential wars" in the 20''^ century by noting that
"While kings may have the right to promulgate laws simply
be decree, it is Rule of Law which is king in our form of

government."

Another, congressman. Jack Metcalf, concurs,

stating that "Congress has ceded to the executive Branch,
its fundamental Constitutional duty," and that in decisions
to declare war, "the framers expected national policy to be

the result of open and full debate.""

11

Though both Hamilton and Madison were considered the
two who best understood the importance of the allocation of

war powers, it was Madison alone who focussed on this
section of the Constitution because he "foresaw the twin

problems of fear and violence giving strength to the
Executive."

John Hart Ely cites the following reasons why the

Founding Fathers vested the power to declare war with the
legislative:
• A determination not to let such decisions be taken
easily

• The inclusion of the House of Representatives into

the decision - despite their lack of expertise on
foreign affairs — to slow down the process, to assure
a "sober second thought"

• The inclusion of the House of Representatives into
the decision since it is viewed as "the people's

house" and would increase the participation of the
people

Ely also noted that James Madison considered war to be
"among the greatest of national calamities" and so sought

12

to design the Constitution to assure the expectation of

peace. In addition, Madison stated the following:
The Constitution supposes, what the History
of all Governments demonstrates, that the

Executive is the branch of power most interested

in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly
with studied care, vested the guestion of war in
the Legislative.

17

Peter Raven-Hansen's has delineated the following six

major conclusions from the War Clause of the Constitution:
1. The framers intended it to be harder to initiate
war than to achieve or continue peace

2. Congress' power to "declare" war was not merely
ceremonial, but rather the power to commence war

when it had not already been commenced against us
by an enemy

3. The president has clear power to repel sudden attacks
4. The president has sole power as Commander-in-Chief
to conduct all wars

5. Congress' appropriation power with respect to the
military was designed to keep "the means of

carrying on the war" in the legislative, not the
executive branch

6. Congress' power to grant letters of marque and
13

reprisal applies in the same manner to uses of
force less than war"

W. Taylor Reveley sheds light on the cause of the

debate by listing the following four main influences on the
division of authority oyer war and peace between the
president and Congress:

1. The text of the Constitution's war-power provisions

2. The purposes of those who wrote and ratified the
text in 1787-88

3. Evolving beliefs since 1789 about what the
Constitution requires, and — irrespective of text,
purposes, and evolving beliefs
4. Various allocations of control over the war powers

that have existed in fact between the President and
19

Congress during the past two centuries

We have already discussed the text of the Constitution

(Reveley's point #1) and original intent (#2). What Reveley
also noted is that time can change how the text of the

Constitution is interpreted. In addition, the de facto

allocation of war powers has not always followed the letter

14

of the law. (How else do we find that only six of the 20Q
armed conflicts in Vi^hich the U.S. has been involved were
formally declared wars by Congress?)

■ 20"

Reveley's points are important because they

acknowledge both the de jure and de facto nature of the

military actions that have been taken and contribute to a
more sophisticated analysis of a complex problem. But were
the issues involved in the debate over Constitutional war

powers simple, they would not remain unresolved to the

So after over 200 years of constitutional analysis,
some scholars categorically assert that the poWer to
declare war is vested only in Congress, while others

support the idea of wide executive prerogative, which was

so eloquently and convincingly proposed by Locke that it is
easy to understand why the idea was so prominent in the
minds of the framers of the Constitution, despite the
determination to form a government that would never be
subject to a monarch.

15

Chapter III:
Theories of the Nature of Executive Power

The first constitutional challencre;

I never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the
Executive alone to declare war.

Elbridge Gerry

21

Not long after being ratified in 1789, the

Constitution was subject to heated debate regarding the
designation of war powers between Congress and the
executive. The debate began in 1793 when President George

Washington issued a Neutrality Proclamation intended to
keep the United States Out of the series of conflicts and
.

.

22

wars raging in Europe between France and Great Britain.

Analysis of the proclamation showed the strong bias of
the Federalist Party

(which included the president,

Alexander Hamilton and John Jay) in favor of Great Britain.
The Republican Party

(which included Thomas Jefferson

and Madison) considered the proclamation unfair to France,

which had supported the American colonists in their
revolution of independence from Great Britain. As Jacob
■ .

16

Javits notes, "no dilernma Gonfronting the President
reflected the faction in his cabinet with more clarity than
the battle regarding neutrality."

The debate about Washington's Neutrality Act was

conducted partly in print when Madison — urged by Jefferson

— used the nom de plume "Helvidius" to publish a series of
letters in opposition to Hamilton (who wrote under the name
"Pacificus"). Ruth Weissbourd Grant and Stephen Grant

summarized Madison's arguments by stating the following,
which demonstrates Madison's strict interpretation of the
Constitution:

Madison argues further that the executive
interpretation of treaties cannot in any case
include a right to judge whether or not the
nation is obliged to go to war under a treaty.
Such a right is inseparable from the power to
declare war, and as such is a usurpation of power

given to the legislature and a violation of
separation of powers.

Madison's points may be substantiated if we examine
the various neutrality acts that have been passed in the
United States. When we do, we find that it is Congress that

usually initiates such proclamations. It was Congress that

passed a neutrality act in 1794 to curb private activities

17

in foreign inilitarY actions and Congress that passed the
Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937, "many of them
warned about increasing the power of the president in
foreign affairs beyond congressional reach."

27

With his Neutrality Proclamation, Washington 

operating under the advice of Hamilton — announced that it
was the "duty and interest" and the "disposition" of the

country to be impartial in the war which had broken out in
Europe between France and Great Britain. Washington warned
Americans not to "contravene such disposition" because he
believed that the United States "was not obligated under

its 1778 treaty with France to enter the war on the side of
that nation."

If we use the measure of character — as mentioned in

chapter one, we would see in Washington a great leader who

exemplified much of what was best about the United States.

Many — in his time and now - believed that he "symbolized
qualities of discipline, aristocratic duty, military
orthodoxy, and persistence in adversity that his
contemporaries particularly valued as marks of mature

political leadership."

In light of this, it may seem

18

inappropriate for anyone to question Washington's motives
and methods.

Yet the debate between Hamilton and Madison over the

proclamation was more a test of the new constitution's

policies than an attack on Washington's character. Madison
conceded that a similar proclamation might be justified,

but on narrower grounds. Hamilton cited the "vesting

blanse": bf Article^;!^^

he and others - primarily

Federalists who favored a strong executive — interpreted as

giving the executive wide powers.

According to Sidney Milkis and Michael Nelson,
Gouverneur Morris (chief draftsman of the Constitution's

Committee of Style) deliberately left the wording of the
vesting clause for the executive vague. The clause states

that "the executive power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America," leaving an opportunity for

many constitutional scholars to note that no exhaustive
list of executive powers is delineated. However, Morris
worded the vesting clause for Congress to read that "All

legislative powers herein granted [emphasis added] shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States".
The latter clause implies that only the powers

specifically listed in the Constitution belong to Congress.

iMcSer this stiict interpretatioh/ GQngresS cannot ciai^vt

saine coiiceht Of Locke'h ;*pfarpgat^

:as can tha executive.

Locke explains "prerogative" below;
For the legislators not being able
^
foresee and provide by laws for all that may be
useful to the community, the executor of the laws

:

[the "executive"], having the power in his hands,
has by the common law of Nature a right to make
use of it to for the good of society, in many
cases where the municipal law has given no
"V

■

direction.

The above quotation refers to the difference between

"natural law" and "positive law." Natural law is "a body of

law or a specific principle held to be derived from nature

and binding upon human society in the absence of or in
addition to positive law," while positive law is
"established or recognized by governmental authority."
Michael Glennon notes how the Roman empire "promulgated a

law of nations that has been interpreted as little
different from natural law in its emphasis on universal

principles of justice and equality."

One can see how

Locke used the idea of natural law — as opposed to

specifically prescribed law — as the idea behind

20

presidential prerogative, which would support Washington's
purview to declare a "state of neutrality."
The debate over Washington's Neutrality Proclamation
ended with an apparent victory for Hamilton and those who
favored a strong executive. Occurring in the first

presidency, this conflict signaled what would be an on

going battle between Congress and the executive over war
powers, and demonstrated that the framers of the
Constitution had not been able to reach consensus over the
nature of the executive.

In defense of democracy:

The necessary exactions of any government bring more danger and
dishonor to free governments than to tyrannies,
Harvey Mansfield

34

Often inherent in the beliefs of those who favor a

strong executive is the view that democracy cannot be

defended by weak governments, or by presidents on whom too
many limitations of power have been imposed. Thomas Carlyle

expressed concern about strong governments by asking, "If
the government is big enough to give you everything you

21

wantj is it big enough to take away everything you have?"

35

In his special message to Congress on July 4, 1861,
President Abraham Lincoln paraphrased Carlyle by asking,
"Must a Government, of necessity, be too strong for the

liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its
own existence?"

Harvey Mansfield sympathizes with Lincoln. Mansfield
notes that free republics often "come to grief or fade into
memories of glory," and cites the examples of Venice and

many German cities, as well as free republics that
"blossomed large and grew small fruit" (e.g., the Dutch

republics), or republics that "remained locked in a
mountain retreat" (e.g., the Swiss cantons).

However,

Mansfield also notes that the tyrannical excesses of

"republics" —such as Cromwell's Commonwealth in England
after the deposing and beheading of Charles I — "left
republicanism with a heavy burden of popular disgust and
.

.

38

learned disdaxn."

As we try to determine when presidential actions
exceed their authority, we should ask ourselves how far we

want our government to go in defending what many consider

22

the best form of government (i.e., a representative
democracy, as in the United States).

Some political theorists believe that since no mere
document — including the Constitution — can stop real

tyranny, the executive must be strong.

Such theorists

extol the decisive — and successful — actions taken by

Lincoln during the Civil War and note that the U.S. has
been fortunate to have had strong executives during its

most prominent wars (e.g., James Polk during the Mexican ,
War, Woodrow Wilson in World War I, and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt in World War II).

-

Despite the reasons stated above for a strong

executive, those who wish a government free of tyranny

concern themselves with trying to curtail excesses of

power. Though it may be too naive to believe — as pessimist
Arthur Schopenhauer did — that "ethical goals cannot be
achieved by unethical means,"

Glennon states that

"governmental deceit is saddening because it bespeaks a
distrust of the insight and good sense of the people."
To those in favor of a strong executive, Glennon's

statement is fraught with misconceptions. First,

"governmental deceit" is sometimes warranted. While it can

23

be pointed out that this is especially true during,times of
war, it can additionally be said that in today's world of
continual global conflict * covert actions

while often

unsavory — are unavoidable. However, we then are left with
the fact that some covert actions - which are directed by

the executive through the CIA and National Security Council
— have been conducted contrary to congressional will and

.ic sentiment (e.g., Reagan's funding of the Contras in
Nicaragua despite the Boland Amendments).
Second, Glennon's belief in "the insight and good

sense of the people" leads to understandable debate. The
constitutional democracy of the United States is structured

to avoid a tyranny of the masses — the majority of whom are
not as well-educated or informed as their elected

representatives, an arguably not as "virtuous" as the
framers of the Constitution. The specter of ochlocracy

(i.e., mob rule) is abated by the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights that work in tandem to provide a wide degree of
individual freedom, yet within a constitutional framework
that provides for a representative form of government.

Thus, we achieve as much as possible Aristotle's ideal of a

government led by "aristocrats" (i.e., those with the moral
and intellectual ability to represent others best).
. .

24

i

We end the question of how best to defend a democracy

without employing too many undemocratic actions with a

quotation from Glennon, who states that while diplomacy can
clash with constitutionalism, the "interests of diplomacy

cannot be pursued by discarding the interests of
constitutionalism."

To Glennon, democracy can ^ and

should ^ be defended with actions that not only support,

but are consonant with the ideals of democracy.

Situational analysis of presidential prerogative:

The state's annihilation are of the highest importance in the moral
calculus, and that acting to prevent the state's destruction may take
precedence over competing mora.1 cleims,
44

Michael Walzer

In reviewing presidential actions, we sometimes fail
to consider the concept of prudence as dealing with unique
situations that cannot be anticipated.

Such situations

cannot be legislated easily in advance and demonstrate the

limitations of any constitutipn, especially one drafted by
leaders (e.g., Madison) who believed that the United States

usually would be at peace. As John Hart Ely notes, it is
25 '■ ■

"triiiy ithpossibl

to predict arid Specify all the pdssibie

situations in which the president will need to act to

protect the nation's security before he has time to obtain
congressional authorization."

The following quotation by Locke describes how his
concept of prerogative was designed to recognize the

special times when the normal legislative process could not
be followed without seriously jeopardizing the state:

: This power to act according to discretion
for the public good, without the prescription of
the law and sometimes even against it> is that
which is called prerogative; for since in some
governments the law-making power is not always in
■; being and is usually too numerous, and so too
slow for the dispatch requisite to execution, and
because, also, it is impossible to foresee and so

by laws to provide for all accidents and
necessities that may concern the public [emphasis
added] . . . therefore there is a latitude left
to the executive power to do many things of
choice which the laws do not prescribe.

One of the many mistakes made by the 1973 War Powers

Act was trying to delineate when presidents could and could
not initiate military actions without congressional

approval. The framers of the act seemed to overlook the
fact that certain situations allowed limited presidential

action. Though not listed in the War Powers Act, presidents

■
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have the constitutional right to use the military to rescue

U.S. citizens abroad, rescue foreign nationals when it

directly affects the rescue of its own citizens, protect
embassies, implement cease-fires involving the U.S., and to
carry out the security commitments in a treaty.

48

Yet despite the logic of the arguments detailed above,
there have been times when both Congress and the public

have questioned presidential actions. Challenging the

application of the domino theory and containment, many
Americans protested against the Vietnam War with

unparalleled violent dissent, journalist Walter Lippmann
called containment a "strategic monstrosity" because it did

not adequately differentiate "vital from peripheral areas,"

and had the potential of causing many unnecessary military
conflicts in non-strategic places around the globe.
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While Michael Glennon notes that "presidential

authority exists in emergency situations of bona fide
threats to the survival of the nation,"

he also notes

that "crises have been the cause of constitutional
imbalance."

Part of the conflict between Congress and

the executive relates to how those two branches of

government define a crisis and that it is Congress that
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usually depends on a strict application of the
Constitution, which it tries to use to gain more

involvement in military actions and foreign affairs.
Yet there are times when the situation demands quick,

decisive, action that logistically only can be achieved by
the executive. No case better exemplifies this than that of
President Lincoln and the actions he took during the Civil

War. Though Lincoln's actions have been labeled
unconstitutional by some scholars, others defend his
actions because they occurred under the unique
circumstances of an insurrection. Robert Tucker notes the
following:
The state "has been found almost everywhere

to be, if not the source of values, then at least

the indispensable condition of values . . . This
serves to justify the extreme measures which may
be taken to preserve it."

Yet, according to Jacob Javits, Lincoln "assumed a

series of powers relating to the conduct of the war and of
the national life that were constitutionally unwarranted"

and "Lincoln's assumption of war powers was on so huge a
scale as to change historically the nature of the

28

QOnstitutional

These actions included the

following:

• Calling the "emergency Congress" three months after
most of the drastic actions he took at the
outbreak of the Civil War in 1861

• Appropriating funds for the military without
required laws passed to do so.
the writ of habeas corpus (a power

specifically granted in the Constitution to
Congress)

• Ordering summary arrests (i.e., without warrant)

• Barring from the mails any materials he deemed
inimical to the national interest

• Confiscating personal property

• Applying a system of martial law to persons
instead of to areas

Alexander Bickel, however, defends Lincoln's actions

by noting the importance that circumstance plays in
relation to presidential actions. Bickel states that
"Lincoln's actions in the singular circumstances of the
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outbreak of civil war were not only great and good, but

different in legal contemplation from the international use
of force.

Bickel — like many constitutional scbolars —

differentiates between military actions during an
insurrection and those during wan with a foreign country.

And despite the fact that the special constitutional powers
granted for repelling insurrections were given to Congress,
not the executive, Corwin recalls Locke's notion of

presidential prerogative by noting that "in meeting the
domestic problems that a great war inevitably throws up, an
indefinite [emphasis added] power must be attributed to the
president."
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In the special session of Congress on July 4, 1861,
Lincoln reviewed the initial stages of the Civil War and

explained the extraordinary actions he had taken in the
months prior to this congressional session. Lincoln noted
that the "Founding Fathers did not think in every case that

danger should run its course until Congress convened,"
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though he did not explain why he waited three months to
convene Congress. While some support his actions by

reminding us of the limited transportation and
communication of that era (i.e., no e-mails or bullet
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trains),

others speculate that Lincoln wanted that time

to assume dictatorial powers which he considered necessary

to act quickly against the insurrection.
Sounding a bit Machiavellian, near the end of that
message of July 4, 1861, Lincoln also noted that "when an

end is lawful and obligatory/ the indispensable means to it
are also lawful and obligatory."

But the differences

between Machiavelli and Lincoln are obvious. Machiavelli
believed that "princes" should employ all and any means

necessary to retain power. In contrast, Lincoln did only
"what he deemed his duty" to preserve the Union. His
actions adhered to Locke's concept of prerogative because

they were enacted "according to the public good" and with
the idea that all the actions were those that Congress

would have made." (This was substantiated when Congress
upheld Lincoln's early war actions.)

Those who disagree with Locke's notion of prerogative
may have supported Lincoln's actions during a civil war,
but would have labeled them clearly unconstitutional had

they been taken during a war with a foreign nation. Such
scholars would note the limitations of prerogative as we

will debate in depth at the end of this thesis. However,
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those who believe that we should only focus on the "ends" —

regardless of the "means" — would concur with Machiavelli's
infamous quotation noted above.
We conclude this discussion of circumstance and

Lincoln's actions during the Civil War with the following

quotation by Sidney Milkis and Michael Nelson:
While Lincoln's grasping of the reins of

power caused him to be denounced as a dictator,
other aspects of his leadership demonstrated more
obviously his faithfulness to the purpose for
which the Union and the Constitution had been

ordained. Thus, the Constitution, although

stretched severely, was not subverted during the
Civil War.
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Iioss of Congressional Power in Foreign Affairs

"The war-making power of the president constantly erodes the wardeclaring power of Congress,"
Louis Fisher

According to Alexander Bickel, the erosion of
congressional power has been slow, but steady, and many

presidential exploits "have denuded the Congress of its
portion of the war powers and have ended by establishing
the imperial President."

Since wars generally require

swift action that American presidents have rarely avoided,
the executive branch has gained extended power during war.

One reason why Congress has difficulty in reasserting
its influence on foreign affairs after wars is because it
has not reached a clear consensus regarding the nature of
the executive and how that relates to both military and

peacetime actions of the president.
In the Mexican War, Congress acquiesced to President
James Polk and officially declared the war after the

president had sent U.S. troops into disputed territory.
However, Congress also officially censured Polk's actions
after the war. Many scholars consider Polk's actions the
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cause of the Mexican War and note that "Polk was so intent

on acquiring California, which belonged to Mexico, that he

was prepared in early May 1846 to make war on Mexico with
or without a pretext."

When President Wpodrow Mlspn tried to gain support
for his 14 Points and the League of Nations, he met

opposition from both foreign leaders (i.e., Clemenceau in
France) and American statesmen. Chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, the conservative Henry Cabot Lodge was

known as Wilson's chief legislative obstacle. Lodge
announced his own "14 Points," a reservation for each of

Wilson's proposed policies. Lodge asked Wilson if he were

willing to put his soldiers and sailors at the disposition
of other nations. Most of Lodge's reservations were
intended to remind the executive "that Congress would
retain its constitutional role in foreign affairs."

Reflecting the public's anti-war sentiments and

congressional concern regarding their loss of power in
foreign affairs. Congressman Louis Ludlow introduced the
"Ludlow Amendment" in 1938 to require "a national
referendum on decisions for war," despite President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's objections.
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Though he gnce believed that "American diplomacy would
be better served if Congress generally deferred to the

president,"

Senator William Fullbright later agreed with

Michael Glennon that "aCtivd involvement of all three

branches is required if this hation's foreign policy is to
be measured successfully against the requirements Of the
Constitution" and if "the balance intended for our

constitutional structure is to be restored." 7^
In addition to their concerns about a loss of power in

foreign affairs, Congress has expressed its concern over
the years that many presidents have abused the concept of

prerogative and committed unconstitutional actions in
defense of their private goals. As an example, many

presidents have issued doctrines intended to promote their
international agendas, whether Congress supported them or
not.

President Monroe issued his doctrine in 1823, though

it was not supported by congressional legislation or
affirmed in international law. For many years it remained

only a policy that asserted U.S. interests with an intent
to diminish foreign (non-U.S.) colonialization of the
Caribbean and Latin America. But eventually, the Monroe
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Doctrine was used by several presidents for national and

personal aggrandizement. Polk used the doctrine in 1845

against British threats in California and Oregon, and to

justify the annexation of Texas, only one of the actions he
took that instigated the war with Mexicb in 1846.

Though President McKinley announced no specific
doctrine, his actions during the Spanish-Aitierican War and
his interference in the Philippine struggle for

independence were considered by some to be examples of "the
inherent ability of the executive to aggrandize his own

prerogatives."

During the Filipino wars on independence,

McKinley — despite support for the rebels by the American

public — took actions to control that country and any in
the United States who spoke against his actions. He gave

American generals in the Philippines cart blanche to

suppress the insurrections. In the United States he tried
,

to suppress free speech by censoring the press.
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As

Javits notes, "McKinley's actions — and those of his
immediate successors, dramatized the inherent ability of

the executive to aggrandize his own prerogatives within the
context of a perfectly legal exercise of constitutionally
assigned authority."
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Theodore Roosevelt developed his own oorollary to the

Monroe Doctrine, stating that the United States had "police

power" over Latin America. He used this proclamation to
acquire control over the Panama Canal during the 1903
revolution in that country. Despite the opposition of
Panama's nationalist leaders, the U.S. forced a treaty on

the country that named the United States as "guarantor of
Panamanian independence," and gave the U.S. the right to
76

intervene in case of military disorder in the country.

Though the Republican-dominated 80"^ Congress
eventually supported the Truman Doctrine by providing the
financial means for it to be carried out, it was normally

hostile to the president. Thomas Patterson writes that

"many in Congress resented Truman having handed them a fait
accompli" when he announced the Triaman Doctrine on March
12, 1947. The doctrine was aimed at blocking Communist

expansion anywhere in the world, though especially in
Greece and Turkey. It became "the commanding guide to U.S.

foreign policy in the Cold War.""
Though no major wars officially have been declared
after World War II, Truman's foreign policy - articulated

by George Kennan (Director of the State Department Policy
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Planning Staff) — began the era of "containment" that

triggered numerous regional and international conflicts

through both sanctioned and covert actions in the 20*"^
century. Though undeclared wars, these conflicts had all
the catastrophic effects of officially declared wars: they
caused innumerable deaths, devastated cultures, and ruined

economies, yet seldom resulted in definitive solutions to
global hostilities. While it is not obvious what actually
caused the Cold War, it can be said that containment
contributed to the increase in presidential wars during
that era.

President Eisenhower broadened the Truman Doctrine by

issuing his own on January 5, 1957. Though both houses of

Congress approved it. Senator William Fullbright represented
a vocal minority when he protested that the administration
"asks for a blank grant of power . . . to be used in a blank

way, for a blank length of time, under blank conditions with

respect to blank nations in a blank area . , . Who fills in
the blanks?"

It should be noted that while Eisenhower did not

announce his doctrine until 1957, prior to that year, he had

sanctioned several covert actions across the globe without

congressional approval. These included the overthrow of
38

popularly-elected foreign leaders such as Arbenz in
Guatemala (1954) and Mossadegh in Iran (1954).
The doctrines cited above and others illustrate the

growing power of the executiye to position the U.S. in
situations that have the high potential of instigating
armed conflicts. But except for refusing to support

Wilson's 14 Points and not ratifying the Veisailles Treaty

that ended World War I, Congress usually accepted the fait

accomplis of presidential decrees, thus participating as an
often silent partner in the erosion of their constitutional
powers.

The War Powers Act of 1973;

The War Powers Act of 1973 undertakes to establish a procedure for

comity as to different views in the future, so that Congress can be

brought in from the periphery of the warmaking power to its center in
order to exercise its proper role.
79

Senator Edmund Muskie

In view of the presidential actions listed above - and
presidential actions during the Vietnam War and Watergate
investigation — it should be no surprise that a time came
when Congress took definitive steps to clarify the
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constitutional division of war powers and attempt to

exercise more control over foreign affairs, especially in
decisions to commit U.S. troops abroad.
In 1973 — over the veto of President Nixon — Congress

passed the War Powers Act, an attempt to reassert its role
in foreign affairs, especially in decisions to introduce
U.S. troops into military action. Introduced by Senator
Jacob Javits, the bill was passed along with the Budget and

Impoundment Control Act, which was designed to strengthen

Congress' power over foreign affairs through better fiscal
controls.

The War Powers Act was described by many as a feeble

attempt at best to diminish the number of undeclared wars
in which the U.S. could be involved. After it passed.

Congress required the president to "consult" with it
"whenever possible" prior to committing troops and to
submit an official, written report to Congress within 48
hours after troops were introduced into combat. In

addition. Congress could recommend withdrawal of troops

after 60 days if it did not concur with the purpose of
their deployment (see Appendix C).
But the 1973 War Powers Act never was the success it
was intended to be. Over the years, liberals,
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conservatives. Republicans and pemocrats have all attacked

the law, labeling it unconstitutional and impractical. Some

claim that the wording of the act is not definitive enough

to provide real guidance. While Congress may think that the
requirement to "consult" with them prior to committing

troops means to be "asked by the President for their advice
and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their

approval of action contemplated,"

presidents have said

that it was not clear with whom they were to consult (i.e.,

the entire Congress or a representative group) and have
defined "consult" in the narrowest of terms. They may have

consulted (met) with Congress, but have not always
concurred with — or acted on — their advice.

When President Clinton sent troops to Haiti in 1994,
he stated that while he would welcome the support of

Congress, he "did not agree that he was constitutionally
mandated to obtain it."

According to Tom Raum, "All

presidents since Nixon have found ways to sidestep the
act."

In addition to the problems cited above, Congress does
not seem to have considered U.S, participation in

multinational organizations (e.g., the United Nations) and
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alliances (e.g., NATO, SEATO, etc.) when it drafted the War
Powers Act. U.S. involvement in such organizations and

treaties has generated so many military actions that it was
considered necessary in 1994 to enact the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, which established new requirements for

the president to consult with Congress prior to committing
troops to "peacekeeping actions."

Congress has accused presidents of cloaking their own
administration's war goals by taking advantage of what they
describe as U.S. international obligations. They have done

so despite clauses such as Article 11 of the North Atlantic
Treaty which states that its provisions are to be carried

out by the parties "in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes

Most interpret that clause to

imply some role for Congress — or the specific nation's
legislative branch — in the event of war. As Congressman
Vito Marcantonio noted, "When we agreed to the United
Nations Charter we never agreed to supplant our

Constitution with the UN Charter."

Marcantonio asserts

that the deployment of troops in the name of organizations
such as the UN and NATO - which are not sovereign bodies 

cannot supercede the regulations of its individual member
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nations. It would require a constitutional amendment for
the United States to subvert its laws to those of
international bodies.

The effects of the War Powers Act are ambiguous.

Despite it, presidential wars have continued. Since 1973,
Congress has received only 50 reports under the Act (4 by
Ford, 1 by Carter, 14 by Reagan, 7 by Bush and 25 by
Clinton). The increasing number of reports should indicate
that simply having to submit a report to Congress — or even
seek their "consent" to deploy troops — has not controlled

presidential military actions. As a consequence, the War
Powers Act continues to receive widespread criticism and

attempts either to amend it or abolish it.
Yet despite its warranted criticisms, one might wonder
if the number of presidential wars would be even greater
without the War Powers Act. While the act has not

completely eliminated military action without the consent
of Congress, its existence has served over the years to be
a constant reminder to both Congress and to the executive
that acts of war should not be conducted unilaterally. And

though most presidents have sought to circumvent the act,
few presidents have been able to avoid its mandates
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Congressional Limitations:

One might ask why Congress has not used its "power of

the purse" to curtail unilateral presidential military
•

'
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actions by denying funding of such actions.

Some

speculate that while Congress fights to retain the official
power to declare war, presidential military actions have
the benefit of shielding Congress from public criticism of
actions that it may have eventually sanctioned. Glennon

notes that "Congress, as partner, has approved an American
role that would be used to justify presidential rejection
of the partnership."

Some congressional critics note that Congress — while

complaining of military actions it did not approve in
advance — has not acted sufficiently on its power of the

purse. It continues to fund presidential wars, imposing

:

only minor legislation to curtail them. Even Lincoln voted
financial support for the Mexican War, though he strongly

disagreed with actions taken by President Polk. It seems to
be the natural tendency for Congress to complain while
'

continuing to fund presidential military actions.
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Many speculate that members of today's Congress are

not adequate to the job of serving as a balance to
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executive prerogative. They accuse congressinen of focussing
too much on getting reelected and not taking action strong

enough to direct appropriately foreign and national policy.
Despite a general lack of interest in foreign affairs by
the American public — compounded by a low voting rate —

Congress makes feeble complaints regarding its declining
power, though it creates administrative work to perpetuate
itself while avoiding controversy. As George Will notes,
"Government is becoming less respected as it increases its

scope and becomes a 'servile state,'" gleefully buried in
bureaucratic responsibilities that shield it from
,
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addressing any issues that are considered controversial.
Thus, congressmen can avoid such issues in order to
increase their chances for reelection.

In order for Congress to become more affective,

drastic changes in the political culture of the United
States would have to occur. Such changes should reduce the

administrative role of Congress in a "servile state,"
reconsider the use of term limits as a way to improve

election to Congress, and reevaluate how the separation of

powers outlined in the Constitution can achieve real
balance, with meaningful congressional participation in
foreign affairs. Such participation could serve to check
,
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presidential prerogative, especially as it is used in
military actions.
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Chapter V:

The Iiimits o£ Presidential Prerogative

No overzealous President should involve the U.S. in unnecessary

hostilities while avoiding congressional scrutiny.
Ronald Rotunda

We have examined many conflicting ideas of

presidential prerogative and specific cases to understand
how that concept has been applied. Alexander Hamilton
believed in a strong presidency, even in time of peace. And

Madison — known for his support of the Republican view of a
limited executive defined by strict constitutional
allocation of powers — once conceded the need for

presidential prerogative.
Yet there must be some limits to prerogative, even for

those who support a strong executive and find the need for

presidential prerogative even greater in the war-torn 20*^^
century than when it was described by Locke. Are there

limits to prerogative? Were President McKihley's actions
against not only the Filipino insurgents, but those in the

Uiiited States who opposed him appropriate? When President
Truman sent troops to Korea without congressional approval,
was he within the limits of prerogative when he asserted

47

"an inherent and seemingly unlimited [emphasis added]

presidential authority to protect any 'interest of American

foreign policy'"?" And when President Clinton bombed
KOSOVO and Serbia under presidential edict, was that within
presidential prerogative?
Justice Robert Jackson stated that "presidential

powers are not fixed, but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress"
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His

fellow justice. Chief Justice John Marshall "did not want
to define the limits of presidential power in the face of
complete congressional silence." Marshall went further to

state that the "president is invested with certain

important political powers and decisions of the executive
are conclusive and can never be examined by the courts."
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Taking a more optimistic approach in reviewing
presidential actions, Alexander Bickel states that "there

are very few instances in our history where a president has
taken the law into his own hands against the will of

Cdngress."

But Bickel's statement forces the question of

how he defines "the will of Congress" and if the president
should determine what Congress wants.
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As evidence of a need to limit presidential

prerogative, congressional scholars could list the
following presidential actions that Congress did not

support, or for which Congress was not consulted in
advance:

• Jefferson's supervision of the Louisiana Purchase
• Folk's actions that instigated the Mexican War

• Nixon's claim that "If the president does it, it is
not illegal"

• Reagan's funding of the Centra's despite the Boland
Amendment

In relation to the limits of presidential prerogative,

Harvey Mansfield's comment below further exemplifies the
ambivalence of executive power:

The beauty of executive power . . . is to be
both subordinate and not subordinate, both weak

and strong, and to reach where law cannot [using
prerogative], and thus supply the defect of law,
yet remain subordinate to law.

Throughout his writings, Mansfield notes the
ambivalence of the executive that "permits its strength to
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Be useful to republics, without endangering them." '' But
despite the contradictions of its power, the executive
continues to assert prerogative, leaving Congress and the

public able only to hope for the best. As Milkis and Nelson
note, "the design of the executive was one of the most

vexing problems of the Constitutional Convention," where
the framers "labored in the realm of intellectual and

political uncertainty."

j

Mansfield has not been the only scholar to use the

word "ambivalent" in relation to executive power. It is

often employed in discussions related to the American

presidency. According to Richard Pious, "executive power
was a general term, sufficiently ambiguous so that no one

could say precisely what it meant."

Though it was clear

that the Framers did not want a monarch, they demonstrated

their.own ambivalence regarding executive power as they
struggled to make that branch of government strong enough

to protect the Union from both foreign and domestic foes,

without making it so powerful that it could not work within
the confines of the Constitution and avoid the extremes of

the royal prerogative exercised by British monarchs.
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The Effects of the Cold War and Post-Cold War Era;

The Colcl War era (approximately 1945 - 1990) Greated

an international context of perceived continual crisis

during which American presidents increased their use of
prerogative through an escalated use of military actions.
This was possible because the Cold War was considered an
actual war, whether hostilities manifested themselves in

military action or in ideological rhetoric. Concluding at
one time that "American diplomacy in general , . . would be
better served if Congress generally deferred to the

president," Glennon notes the following:
As the 1950s proceeded, and in a Congress
where parochialism still reigned, it was not
difficult to be persuaded that modern realities
required greater latitude for the president and
that proponents of congressional prerogative were
■
■ ■, '
X02
agents of unenlightened reaction.

During the Cold War, American presidents felt
unrestrained in their use of military power. Though not a

formally declared war, the Cold War contributed to
expanding executive idea of prerogative. Presidents could
explain that the development of the United States as a
superpower thrust upon the executive branch a breadth of
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responsibility that necessitated corresponding authority •
•

for quick, unilateral action.
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One major factor related to the growth of presidential
military powers during the Cold War was the development of

"weapons of mass destruction." With the authority to "push
the button," presidents could consider the world to be

continually at the brink of nuclear war, a state of mind
they used to make deployment of U.S. troops into actual
military actions seem more palatable, both to Congress and
to the American public.

Examples of presidential actions during the Cold War
include Truman committing troops to the Korean War without

prior congressional approval, Kennedy bringing the world to
the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis,

and Lyndon Johnson coercing Congress into passing the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution during the Vietnam War.
While the majority of the military actions taken

during the Cold War were supported either tacitly or

overtly by Congress, the example of the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution leads us to a discussion on presidential

character and presidential prerogative achieved through

deception. As with the supposed attack on the Maine during
the Spanish-American War, confusion and misinformation have
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contributed to decisions to take military aGtion, Though it

has taken time to recognize that the explosion on the Maine

was due to a problem in the boiler room, the confusion
related to the need for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was

evident in 1964, when it appeared to some that the U.S.

destroyer Maddox had been fired on by the North Vietnamese
•
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in the Gulf of Tonkin.

To complicate matters. President Johnson — and his

Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara — used the confusion
over the Maddox incident to "flagrantly mislead the

Congress.

Glennon cites Johnson's "exaggerations"

(i.e., lies) to Congress when he notes how "in contract

law, a contract induced by fraud or mistake if voidable,"
and that "some analogous doctrine in constitutional law

should apply when statutory authority is given a president
on the basis of fraudulent or mistaken representation."

As evidenced by Nixon's many claims of executive privilege
during the Watergate investigations, there are enough valid
reasons to argue over presidential prerogative without
adding deception by the executive into the debate.
The effects of the Cold War on presidential

prerogative are indisputable. However, the end of the Cold
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War has presented new challenges to presidential

prerogative. Though the United States is a major

participant in global economics, since it is the only
remaining superpower, some believe that the level of U.S.

participation in global politics should be more flexible
today.

With no major rivals, the United States can

redefine its international role, possibly at the expense of

presidential prerogative. Ronald Steel agrees with the
above and lists the following steps that should be taken in
a post-Cold War era:

• The U.S. should not use the UN or NATO to accomplish

its own foreign policy goals under the guise of
"multilateralism" (e.g.. Bush's war against Iraq and
Clinton's intervention in Haiti).

• Realize that foreign policy almost by definition is

an elite preoccupation, but don't let the public
leave it automatically to the experts, who are often

self-appointed and want to promulgate bureaucracy.

• Increase public scrutiny of foreign policy making.
• Don't be tempted to try to police the entire world

or push the goal of "legal order" globally when it
may not be a natural state of affairs. In short,

adopt a much more minimalist approach to foreign
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policy.

Subject foreign policy to more rigorous checks of
reality and practicality by explaining why any
particular war/conflict is necessary.
Acknowledge that non-democratic governments
sometimes have legitimacy and should deserve respect
108

of their sovereignty.
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chapter VI:
Concluding remarks

The United States has been fortunate in having strong

presidents in times of crisis. Furthermore, it is fortunate
that most presidents — Lincoln most notably — have acted
ultimately to protect the precepts of the Constitution,

though they have often done so by wielding power in a
manner that makes some question the limits of prerogative.
But if we examine the word "fortunate," we are

reminded that chance has, indeed, played a large role in

the effectiveness — and appropriateness ^ of presidential

prerogative. Fortunately, there have been relatively few
times when presidential actions have resulted in disasters
for U.S. foreign policy. And while the country could

continue to count on luck, perhaps an amended Constitution

could provide a clearer consensus regarding presidential

prerogative. This could better protect citizens and their
government during times when the country cannot depend
solely on luck, nor hope that presidential actions do not

damage the fabric of democracy, or cause disastrous policy
errors that result in a large-scale loss of life.
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since p'olitics is truly the architectonic science, it
is the nature of humans to seek the power that can help

them attain theit goals,: he those basic {e.g., food,

shelter, clothing, etc.) or more ambitious (e.g., wealth,

happiness, influence, etc.). Because of this — and due to
the continual ambiguity of executive power — conflicts
between Congress and the executive seem inevitable and
endless. While some scholars believe that the Constitution

was designed to ensure slow debate — especially when

military actions were contemplated — others consider

continually conflicts between the legislative and executive
branches as often unnecessary and unproductive.

As indicated earlier, a definition of executive power

that is acceptable to both Congress and the executive has
not been found. And as we have noted, when Congress does

assert its constitutional powers, it often does so with

superficial arguments that do not address the roots of the
problem, which include the ambiguity of executive power,
the seemingly limitless nature of presidential prerogative,
and the successful attempts by Congress to evade public

scrutiny by avoiding controversial decisions.
Accordingly, Americans continue to enjoy their good
fortune, which has - along with a flawed, but exemplary
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Constitution and generally benevolent presidents —
contributed to a stable liberal democracy. Despite weak

congressional actions and the exercise of strong

presidential prerogative, the United States has outlasted
all other superpowers to become the preeminent global
leader, exemplifying the wisdom of its founders and the

strength of its leadership.
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A: The War Glauee of the U.S.

Excerpts from Article I. Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution:

The Congress shall have power To lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and

provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States;

To declare war, grant letters of marque and

reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on
land and water;
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APPENDIX B: Powers vested in the

Executive by the Constitution

Excerpts from Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution

The President shall be commander in chief of the Army

and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several states, when called into the actual service of the

United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of

the principal officer in each of the executive departments,

upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective
offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and

pardons for offenses against the United States, except in
cases of impeachment.

He shall have power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided twothirds of the Senators present concur;
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APPENDIX C: Selections from

the War Powers Resolution of 1973

If U.S. troops are sent into action, the President must do the
following:

• Be responding to a national emergencY created by an
attack on U.S. territory or on U.S. armed forces

• Report to Congress immediately and terminate any use of
troops within 60 days unless Congress specifically approves
of further action (Section 4a-l)

• consult with Congress in every possible instance prior to
the introduction of troops (Section 3). NOTE: The
definition of "consult" has,created different

interpretations of this point. Rresidents have often
considered "consult to mean only to inform, while some

members of Congress believe it means that the President
must seek their advice prior to sending troops, and is some
cases even obtain their approval.

• Consult with Congress regularly after the introduction of
combat troops

• Submit a detailed written report to the Speaker of the

House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate within 48 hours after the introduction of coinbat
troops
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